By Cleiber Levy G. Brasilino; Ricardo Matias Rodrigues; and Rodrigo Duton Alves.
The neutralization of Nemesio Rubén Oseguera Cervantes, known as “El Mencho,” on 22 February 2026 marks a turning point in the history of hemispheric public security. Killed during a precision military operation in Tapalpa, Jalisco, the supreme leader of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) was not merely Mexico’s most wanted criminal, but the architect of a transnational criminal corporation that redefined the operational rules of global drug trafficking.
To understand the magnitude of this event, one must look beyond Mexico’s borders. El Mencho’s downfall reverberates directly across European ports and Brazil’s maximum-security penitentiaries, reshaping a criminal ecosystem in which the CJNG operated with estimated annual revenues ranging between US$8 and US$12 billion. What now emerges is not the end of trafficking, but a dangerous geopolitical reconfiguration.
A Century of Drug Trafficking: The Evolution of Mexican Cartels
The rise of the CJNG and its leader did not occur in a vacuum; it represents the outcome of nearly a century of criminal evolution in Mexico. The first generation of traffickers emerged between the 1930s and 1970s in the so-called “Golden Triangle” (Sinaloa, Durango, and Chihuahua). Early pioneers such as Pedro Avilés Pérez pioneered aerial smuggling, but Operation Condor in 1976 forced criminal migration toward Guadalajara, planting the seeds of modern narcotrafficking.
Between 1978 and 1989, the Guadalajara Cartel — founded by Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, Rafael Caro Quintero, and Ernesto Fonseca Carrillo — created the first large-scale corporate drug structure, sustained through corrupt alliances with Mexico’s state intelligence apparatus (DFS). Its collapse, triggered by the 1985 murder of DEA agent Enrique “Kiki” Camarena, produced the first major fragmentation of the drug trade, dividing territory among the emerging Sinaloa, Tijuana, and Juárez cartels.
At the turn of the millennium, following the collapse of the Colombian Medellín and Cali cartels, Mexican organizations assumed global leadership. This second generation, led by figures such as Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, transformed trafficking into a worldwide logistics network.
However, the controversial “War on Drugs” launched in 2006 by President Felipe Calderón — particularly the kingpin strategy targeting cartel leadership — generated the institutional and criminal chaos that enabled the emergence of a third generation: ultra-violent disruptors. From this fracture emerged Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes.
From Police Officer to Global Capo: The Trajectory of “El Mencho”
Born into poverty in Aguililla, Michoacán, in 1966, El Mencho began his criminal life after illegally migrating to the United States, where he was convicted of heroin trafficking in 1994. Deported in 1997, his trajectory took a paradoxical turn: he infiltrated the state apparatus by becoming a state police officer in Jalisco.
He soon transitioned to the Milenio Cartel as an enforcer, consolidating alliances — notably through marriage into the financial clan “Los Cuinis.” The decisive turning point came in 2010. Following the death of Ignacio “Nacho” Coronel, El Mencho broke alliances, prevailed in a bloody internal conflict, and founded the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG).
His criminal innovation lay in a hybrid formula combining the transnational logistical sophistication of the Sinaloa Cartel with the ultra-violent paramilitary tactics of Los Zetas. Under his leadership, the CJNG adopted armed drones, rocket-propelled grenades, and improvised armored vehicles. Direct confrontation with the state became its hallmark — including the 2015 downing of a Mexican military helicopter and a 2020 assassination attempt against Mexico City security chief Omar García Harfuch. Ironically, successive losses within his inner circle — including the life sentence imposed on his son in the United States in 2025 — progressively isolated him, culminating in his location and death.
The Brazilian Connection: A Logistical Hub and the “El Chepa” Case
Far from being merely a consumer market, Brazil consolidated itself as a vital logistical hub for the CJNG’s operational machinery. The organization’s presence became evident in December 2017 with the arrest of José González Valencia (“El Chepa”) by the Brazilian Federal Police.
Leader of Los Cuinis and El Mencho’s brother-in-law, El Chepa used northeastern Brazil as a leisure destination and a platform for money-laundering operations while living under a false identity. Detained in Aquiraz (Ceará), he spent nearly four years in the federal maximum-security prison of Mossoró, where forced coexistence with the leadership of Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) exposed a critical regional security vulnerability.
The CJNG–PCC relationship must be analytically understood as a client-supplier dynamic rather than subordination. The PCC controls export logistics — particularly through the Port of Santos — while the CJNG purchases logistical services, supplies Andean cocaine via the Triple Border region, and exploits Brazil’s chemical industry to obtain methamphetamine and fentanyl precursors.
Transnational Impacts: Europe and Synthetic Drug Laboratories
The CJNG expanded far beyond the Americas, reshaping Europe’s synthetic drug market. Europol has documented, since 2019, the arrest of dozens of Mexican chemists operating industrial-scale d-methamphetamine laboratories in the Netherlands and Belgium.
Using ports such as Antwerp, Rotterdam, and Algeciras, the cartel introduced cocaine while exporting synthetic drugs, forming logistical partnerships with organizations such as the Italian ’Ndrangheta and the Dutch Mocro Maffia. Unlike earlier criminal generations, the CJNG operated as a corporate entity selling franchises and chemical know-how without requiring direct territorial control in European streets.
Prospective Scenarios: The Post-Mencho World
With the Sinaloa Cartel engulfed in internal conflict since the controversial capture of Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada in 2024, and the CJNG now decapitated, the Western Hemisphere enters its most turbulent criminal phase in two decades. Intelligence analysis suggests three structural scenarios:
1. Mexican Balkanization and the “Battle for Jalisco” (60–70% probability)
A violent succession struggle is likely, opposing family legitimacy against battlefield commanders, potentially increasing homicide rates by 30–50% in critical states such as Jalisco, Guanajuato, and Michoacán.
2. The Rise of the PCC as a “Sovereign Broker”
Simultaneous disruption of the two largest Mexican superstructures strengthens the PCC as the most stable independent logistical operator in global narcotrafficking, enabling price renegotiations, supplier diversification, and increased volatility in the Triple Border region.
3. European Disintermediation and Technological Absorption
Without centralized control from Jalisco, European criminal organizations may absorb CJNG infrastructure, creating autonomous cells but also opening a 6–12 month operational window for coordinated law-enforcement action between Europol and South American agencies.
Conclusion
The Tapalpa operation represents an undeniable tactical victory for the Mexican state and international intelligence cooperation. Yet the death of Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes does not eliminate the CJNG threat; it transforms it. Cartel history demonstrates that leadership vacuums invariably fertilize the emergence of even more volatile structures. For Brazil and Europe, the fall of El Mencho’s empire demands not celebration but maximum vigilance at borders, intensified financial intelligence, and targeted surveillance of strategic ports. The king is dead — but the war has entered a new and unpredictable chapter.
About the Authors:
Cleiber Levy G. Brasilino holds a Ph.D. in Strategic Management, Police Sciences, and Preventive Public Security. He is a specialist in Communication, Public Management, Strategic Intelligence, Psychology, Neurolinguistics, and Law. He is a Lieutenant Colonel in the Military Police of the State of Tocantins. He is the author of “Informational Warfare in Public Security,” “Foundations of Public Communication for Security Institutions,” and “Storytelling Manual for the Public Sector.”
Ricardo Matias Rodrigues holds a Bachelor’s degree in Economics. He has an Executive MBA in Crisis Management and is a specialist in Police Sciences, Competitive Intelligence, and Corporate Counterintelligence. He serves as a postgraduate professor at the Escola da Magistratura Federal do Paraná and is co-author of Alpha Bravo Brasil: Violent Crimes Against Property.
Rodrigo Duton Alves is a Lieutenant Colonel in the Military Police of the State of Rio de Janeiro (PMERJ) and holds a Bachelor of Laws degree. He earned an International Master’s in Security, Intelligence and Strategic Studies (IMSISS), delivered through a consortium of the University of Glasgow, Dublin City University, and Charles University. He serves as an Adjunct Professor at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies and as a Non-Resident Fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. He is a member of the Network of Experts at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime and affiliated with the Instituto Brasileiro de Segurança Pública.
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